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KING v INNOVATION BOOKS: AN ANALYSIS OF CREDIT
ATTRIBUTION WITH RESPECT TO THE
LANHAM ACT
I. INTRODUCTION
Filmmakers must properly credit an author when they adapt
the author's work into a film.1 Most litigation occurs when an au-
thor is improperly credited or not credited in a film or its advertis-
ing.2 Authors may sue under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
when an erroneous credit is used.3 In King v. Innovation Books,4 the
Second Circuit decided whether an author can disassociate himself
from a film that is based upon his work.
In King, author Stephen King sued under section 43(a) to en-
join the use of his name in credits for a film based on his short
story.5 The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the issuance of a preliminary injunction prohibiting
King's name from being used in the film's possessory credits. 6
However, the Second Circuit permitted the use of King's name in a
based upon credit, even though the author wanted no connection
with the film. 7
The Second Circuit found that the film and the short story
were substantially similar, which under the terms of the licensing
contract between King and the filmmakers required the filmmakers
to acknowledge King in a credit.8 The court used the substantial
1. WiLLLAM PACKARD, THE ART OF SCREENWRrTNG 41 (1987). Adapting a film
requires making significant changes to the original work, "[a screenwriter] must be
allowed to rearrange, cut and add whatever he feels is necessary to make the mate-
rial work in cinematic terms." Id.
2. See, e.g., Childress v. Taylor, 945 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1991); Walker v. Time
Life Films, Inc., 615 F. Supp. 430 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
3. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1) (A) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (known as § 43(a)).
The Lanham Act prohibits the commercial use of "any false designation of origin,
false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading representation of
fact" that is "likely to cause confusion ... or to deceive as to [ ] affiliation, connec-
tion or association." Id.; see Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976) (find-
ing violation of § 43(a) where television network eliminated "essential and
humorous" portions of original program thereby causing misleading designation
of program's origin). For a further discussion of Gilliam, see infra notes 83-87 and
accompanying text.
4. 976 F.2d 824 (2d Cir. 1992).
5. Id. at 829.
6. Id. at 826.
7. Id. at 829.
8. Id. at 831.
(147)
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similarity test to compare the works and then used a provision in
the licensing agreement to justify the based upon credit. King is
significant because the court used a novel analysis to require an
author's association with the film.
This Note will first analyze the facts in King. This Note then
examines the creative process of filmwriting: describing the process
from writing the screenplay to marketing and distributing the com-
pleted film and the creative process' interplay with credit attribu-
tion. The legal background relating to federal and state remedies
for misleading and false credit attribution will be explored. This
Note will then analyze the Second Circuit's holding and reasoning
in King. The Note will conclude with a discussion of the impact of
the Second Circuit's holding on authors who license the rights to
their literary works for adaptation into film.
II. FACrs
In 1970, best-selling author Stephen King9 wrote the short
story The Lawnmower Man (Short Story), which was published in
1975.10 Eight years later, King assigned the Short Story's motion
picture and television rights to Great Fantastic Picture Corporation
(Great Fantastic), which eventually assigned the rights to Allied Vi-
sion (Allied), a film production company." The assignment agree-
ment gave Great Fantastic "the 'exclusive right to deal with the
[Short Story] as [it] may think fit'"12 and it allowed King to receive
"an interest in the profits of 'each' film 'based upon' the Short
Story."13 With respect to credit attribution, any assignee had to ac-
9. See Richard Corliss, The King of Creep, TiME, Apr. 27, 1992, at 62. King is the
author of many successful horror thrillers, such as The Shining, Carrie and Salem's
Lot Id.; see also Bill Goldstein, King of Horror, PUBL. WEEKLY, Jan. 24, 1991, at 6.
10. The Lawnmower Man is published in a collection of short stories entided
Nightshifl King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 807 F. Supp. 300, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). The
Short Story is about Harold Parkette, a suburban homeowner, and the man he
hires to mow his lawn. King, 976 F.2d at 827. The lawnmower man, an agent of
the pagan god Pan, has the ability to move the lawnmower by force of mind. Id.
Parkette witnesses the lawnmower man's strange behavior and phones the police.
Id. The lawnmower man then directs the lawnmower to kill Parkette. Id. The
story ends as the police discover Parkette's body in his birdbath. Id.
11. King, 976 F.2d at 826. Allied is used throughout this Note to refer to
Allied, New Line Cinema and Innovation Books. Allied is also synonymous with
filmmaker.
12. Id.
13. Id. The assignment agreement also granted the corporation the rights:
(i) to write film treatments [and] scripts and other dialogue versions of
all descriptions of the [Short Story] and at all times to add to[,] take
from[,) use(,] alter[,] adapt.., and change the [Short Story] .... (ii) to
2
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knowledge King in the credits of any film "wholly or substantially"
based on the Short Story.14
In February 1991, Allied marketed a film entitled The Lawn-
mower Man,'5 describing it as a film "'based upon' a story by Ste-
phen King" and as "Stephen King's The Lawnmower Man."I6 In June
1991, Allied licensed New Line Cinema Corporation (New Line) to
distribute the film in the United States.' 7
After learning of the forthcoming film, King's lawyer, Jay
Kramer, sent New Line several letters protesting its use of King's
name in connection with the film.' 8 The film was released in the
United States on March 7, 1992, with screen credits attributing the
film to King.' 9 Kramer continued to object to the film's credits, but
New Line distributed the film as Stephen King's The Lawnmower
Man.20
King filed suit against Allied and New Line in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York.2' King sought
make or produce films of all kinds ... incorporating or based upon the
[Short Story] or any part or parts thereof or any adaptation thereof.
Id.
14. King, 807 F. Supp. at 305.
15. King, 976 F.2d at 826. The screenplay was completed by August 1990, pre-
production work began inJanuary 1991 and filming began in May 1991. Id. at 826-
27.
The two hour movie centers around a character named Dr. Lawrence Angelo.
Id. at 827. Dr. Angelo experiments with virtual reality technology onjobe, a young
man with a childlike mentality, who mows neighborhood lawns. Id. The technol-
ogy greatly increasesJobe's intellect. Id. Dr. Angelo eventually loses control of the
experiment and Jobe becomes hostile and violent. Id. Jobe uses his powers to
employ the lawnmower to kill Dr. Angelo's neighbor, Harold Parkette. Id. The
police discover Parkette's body in his birdbath. Id. In the climax of the movie, Dr.
Angelo destroys Jobe. Id.
16. Id. at 826. The phrase "Stephen King's The Lawnmower Man" is a posses-
sory credit.
17. Id. at 827. New Line marketed the movie, stating it was "from the mind
of" and "from the imagination of Stephen King." King v. Allied Vision, 807 F. Supp.
at 303.
18. King, 976 F.2d at 827. In a letter dated October 9, 1991, Kramer informed
Allied that "King 'd[id] not want' a possessory credit to appear on the film." Id.
After Kramer received a copy of the screenplay, Kramer wrote another letter to
Allied informing them that King "'emphatically object[ed]' to the possessory
credit." Id. On February 18, 1992, Kramer advised New Line's President of Pro-
duction, Sara Risher, that King was "outraged" at the movie's marketing. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. King v. Allied Vision, 807 F. Supp. 300. Although Allied is a British com-
pany, the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York held
that the United States had jurisdiction to enjoin Allied's actions. Id. at 307; see, e.g.,
Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952); Calvin Klein Indus. v. BFK Hong
Kong, Ltd., 714 F. Supp. 78 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (finding United States courts possess
jurisdiction to enjoin misuse of name in connection with foreign distribution
1994]
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an injunction to prevent Allied and New Line from using his name
in either a possessory or based upon credit2 2 in connection with
the film The Lawnmower Man.23 King claimed that Allied and New
Line falsely designated him as the film's creator.24 King also al-
leged that the use of the possessory and based upon credits violated
section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and New York's law of unfair
competition. 25
The Southern District granted the injunction and concluded
that: 1) the possessory credit was false because King had no part in
developing the screenplay;26 2) the based upon credit was mislead-
ing because the film and the Short Story were fundamentally dis-
similar 27 and 3) King suffered irreparable harm from the use of the
false credits in the form of potential injury to his reputation. 28 The
injunction prohibited Allied and New Line from using King's name
"on or in connection with" the film.29
where defendant's actions substantially interfere with United States commerce).
The district court in King stated that: "The ultimate inquiry is whether 'the con-
tacts and interests of the United States are sufficient to support the exercise of
extraterritorial jurisdiction' under the Lanham Act." King v. Allied Vision, 807 F.
Supp. at 307 (quoting American Rice Inc. v. Arkansas Rice Growers Coop Ass'n,
701 F.2d 408, 412 n.5 (5th Cir. 1983)).
The Southern District held that the interests of the United States supported
applying extraterritorial jurisdiction for the following reasons: 1) King has the
exclusive right to his name throughout the world; 2) King's reputation will be
irreparably harmed by false representations in foreign distribution of the film and
3) Allied contracted for the foreign distribution of the film through a United
States agent. Id.
22. The marketing of the film as "from the mind of" or "from the imagination
of Stephen King" constituted the based upon credits. King v. Allied Vision, 807 F.
Supp. at 303.
23. Id. at 300.
24. King, 976 F.2d at 826. King argued that he was entitled to relief because
he did not contribute to making the film and because "the movie [did not bear]
likeness to the short story which he authored and published under the same
name." King v. Allied Vision, 807 F. Supp. at 302.
25. King v. Allied Vision, 807 F. Supp. at 302. New York's common law of un-
fair competition seeks to prevent unauthorized use of a name or trademark. See
Flexitized Inc. v. National Flexitized Corp., 335 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1964); Windsor,
Inc. v. Intravco Travel Ctrs., Inc., 799 F. Supp. 1513 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). For a further
discussion of state antidilution statutes, see infra notes 107-18 and accompanying
text.
26. King v. Allied Vision, 807 F. Supp. at 305. The district court determined
that the possessory credit was false and misleading because King neither partici-
pated in the making of the film nor approved of the film. Id.
27. Id. The district court held that the based upon credit "grossly exagger-
ated" the relationship between the film and Short Story. Id.
28. Id. The court concluded that such blatant misrepresentation would inevi-
tably and irreparably harm King. Id.
29. Id. at 307.
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On appeal to the Second Circuit, Allied argued that the posses-
sory credit was not false because "the other movie credits make
clear that King was not the producer, director or writer of the
film." 30 The court held that the Southern District did not err in
prohibiting the use of the possessory credit.31 The court deter-
mined that King had no involvement in creating the screenplay,
nor did he approve of the screenplay in advance; therefore, New
Line and Allied's use of the possessory credit was a misrepresenta-
tion that violated section 43(a).32
However, the Second Circuit determined that the Southern
District applied the wrong standard of review for establishing
whether the use of the based upon credit was misleading.33 The
Second Circuit used a quantitative and qualitative test to compare
the Short Story to the film and concluded that the works were sub-
stantially similar.34 The Second Circuit reversed the Southern Dis-
trict's prohibition on the use of the based upon credit because
King's assignment agreement obligated Allied to credit King for any
film "based wholly or substantially" upon the story.3 5
III. BACKGROUND
A. Overview of the Creative Process of Filmmaking
The creative process of filmmaking depends on whether the
film is based on a pre-existing work or if it is an original film. The
creative process for original feature films begins when a screen-
writer presents a screenplay treatment3 6 to an agent, producer or
director.3 7 Once a production company purchases a treatment for
development, the screenwriter develops the story into a full-length
30. King, 976 F.2d at 829. New Line and Allied also analogized the film pro-
ject to other King projects and stated that "King has in the past received a posses-
sory credit where he merely approved in advance of the screenplay or movie." Id.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. John Breglio, an attorney specializing in entertainment law, testified
as an expert for King. Id. Breglio testified that the standard in the film industry
for determining substantial similarity involves "looking 'at the work as a whole and
how much protected material from the underlying work appears in the derivative
work.'" Id. (emphasis in original).
34. Id. at 830.
35. Id. at 831. For a discussion of the original assignment agreement, see
supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text.
36. PAUL MAX RUBENSTEIN, WRITING FOR THE MEDIA 95 (1988). A treatment is
a compressed version of a story that emphasizes its pivotal moments. Id. at 93.
Treatments allow the writer to test the story and view potential mistakes before the
treatment is turned into a full screenplay. Id. at 99.
37. PAcKRiD, supra note 1, at 92.
1994]
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film screenplay.38 Once a film is produced it is then licensed or
sold to distributors and is then released in theaters.3 9
The process varies when a film is adapted from a pre-existing
work because the film's producers must first purchase the right to
use the work, which is generally accomplished through the use of
licensing agreements. These licensing agreements permit film-
makers to adapt the work and require filmmakers to acknowledge
the author of the pre-existing work.40 When an author licenses a
filmmaker to adapt an original work, the licensee is permitted to
cinematically interpret the original work.4' Authors must allow
screenwriters to alter the original work in order to translate the
piece into a successful film adaptation. 42
Producers acknowledge an author's contributions to a film by
placing the author's name in both advertising and screen credits
for the film. 43 Possessory credits and based upon credits are often
used to recognize an author's role.4 4 Possessory credits acknowl-
edge an author who participated in writing the film's screenplay or
approving the screenplay.45 Based upon credits acknowledge that
38. Id. at 93-94. After a screenplay enters film production, the writer must
protect the work from plagiarism by registering the copyrighted work. Id. at 147.
Though this Note does not focus on copyright protection, the Copyright Revision
Act of 1976 mandates copyright protection, beginning automatically upon creation
of a work and extending until 50 years after the author's death. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1976). To register a copyright, a writer can contact the Library of Congress to
obtain forms to fill out and return. PACKARD, supra note 1, at 138. Designation of
the copyright notice on the manuscript and filing with the Library of Congress
"are lthe] only formal registration procedures which are necessary to secure the
protection of [the Copyright Revision Act]." Id. at 139.
39. PACKARD, supra note 1, at 139. Screenwriters and filmmakers should not
relinquish possession of a work by selling ownership of it, they should only license
others to use the work. Id. Since every aspect of a distribution contract is negotia-
ble, there are no standard contracts and no standard rights to which distributors
are entitled. MICHAEL WIESE, THE INDEPENDENT FiLM AND VIDEOMAKERS GUIDE 137-
38 (1986).
40. WIESE, supra note 39, at 38. Films are adapted from a variety of media:
novels, stage plays, biographies and history. Id. To Kill a Mockingbird, The Glass
Menagerie, The Grapes of Wrath and All the President's Men are examples of films that
were adapted from literary works. Id. at 40, 45-47. The alternative to adapting a
pre-existing literary work is to produce a film from an original screenplay. Id. at 7.
41. See PACKARD, supra note 1, at 41.
42. Id. at 44. Not every adaptation results in a successful film. See Jamie
Portman, DePalma Hopes Raising Cain Will Bury Debacle of Bonfire, GAZETTE, Aug. 8,
1992, at ElI (calling screen adaptation of novel The Bonfire of the Vanities "reviled");
Doris Toumarkine, Panel Discusses Hollywood's Novel Approach to Movies, HOLLYWOOD
REP.,Jan. 21, 1994.
43. See, e.g., King, 976 F.2d at 826.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 829. The court stated that "a possessory credit ordinarily is given to
the producer, director or writer of the film." Id.
6
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the film is adapted from an author's original work.46 If the film's
possessory or based upon credits are misleading, an author may sue
to enjoin the use of the credit.
B. Theories of Recovery for False Credit Attribution
A credit is false when an author is credited for a work that has
been substantially altered from the author's original work.47 A false
film credit injures the author because the public associates the au-
thor with a film that is unsuccessful or the public associates the au-
thor with a film that is very different from the author's original
work.48 An author who has been acknowledged in a false or mis-
leading credit can attempt to enjoin the unauthorized use of the
author's name under two legal theories.49 First, the author can sue
under section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, alleging that the use of the
author's name created a false impression as to the origin of the
film. 50 Second, the author can claim that the credit violates state
commerce laws designed to protect reputation.51
1. Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act 52 creates civil liability for any
person who falsely indicates the origin of goods or services or falsely
46. Id.
47. THOMAS D. SELz ET AL, ENTERTAINMENT LAW § 17.07 (Revised ed. 1992).
False credit attribution occurs when an author is credited with creating a work that
the author did not create or when an author's work is edited such that the finished
product no longer resembles the author's work. Id. § 17.47 n.321.
48. Id. § 17.02. The public is also injured because it is deceived into patroniz-
ing a product because of the false credit. Id.
49. Richard E. Wawrzyniak, Unauthorized Use of a Celebrity's Name in a Movie
Title: Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act and the Right of Publicity, 55 Mo. L. REv. 267, 271
(1990); see Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F.
Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.), affld 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
50. Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976).
51. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d 200,
201 (2d Cir. 1979).
52. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988 & Supp IV 1992). The statute provides:
(a) (1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services,
or any container for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, sym-
bol, or device, or any combination thereof, or any false designation of
origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading rep-
resentation of fact, which -
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as
to the affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another
person, or as to the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,
services, or commercial activities by another person, or
(B) in commercial advertising or promotion, misrepresents the na-
ture, characteristics, qualities, or geographic origin of his or her or an-
other person's goods, services, or commercial activities, shall be liable in
7
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describes goods or services. 53 Thus section 43(a) prohibits misrep-
resentations of products or services; these misrepresentations con-
stitute unfair competition. 54 Section 43(a) not only protects the
public from deception, but also protects "economic interests"
analogous to those protected by trademark law.55 In the context of
a false credit attribution, section 43(a) protects the property inter-
est in an author's reputation and it protects the public from confu-
sion as to the origin of a film.5 6
An author is injured by false film credit attributions in two
ways: the credited author is perceived to endorse a film that may be
unsuccessful and the author's reputation is linked directly to the
success or failure of the film. 57 Thus section 43(a) "is primarily
used to rectify credit violations."58
Under section 43(a), an author who alleges false credit attribu-
tion must establish two elements to receive injunctive relief.59 First,
the miscredited author must prove that the use of the author's
name involves goods or services that affect interstate commerce. 60
Second, the author must prove that the other party falsely de-
scribed or falsely designated the origin of the goods or services. 61
a civil action by any person who believes that he or she is or is likely to be
damaged by such act.
Id.
53. Id. In 1989, Congress amended § 43(a) to include expansive judicial in-
terpretations of § 43(a), thereby expanding the section's reach over unfair compe-
tition. SELZ ET AL, supra note 47, § 17.37 n.234. The Trademark Law Revision Act
of 1988 was described as a codification of expansive interpretations of § 43(a). Id.
However, the amendment had little impact on King.
54. SELz ET AL., supra note 47, § 17.37. Although § 43(a) is part of the Lan-
ham Act which is the federal trademark statute, § 43(a) has little connection with
trademarks, as it prohibits unfair competition in a variety of business settings. Id.;
see Ames Publishing Co. v. Walker-Davis Publishing, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 1, 11 (E.D.
Pa. 1974).
55. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The
court stated that § 43(a) protects both a celebrity's reputation and "the public's
interest in avoiding deception." Id.
56. SELz ET AL, supra note 47, § 17.08 n.19.
57. Depending on an author's popularity, credit attribution can serve as a
ticket-buying incentive for the public. PACKARD, supra note 1, at 4. Thus the public
may be deceived by a misleading credit.
58. SELz ET AL, supra note 47, § 17.03 n.19.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612, 625 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). The
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders court added: "(Section 43(a)] is not limited to false des-
ignations of origin, but is directed also to any other false or misleading description
regarding the character or nature of the goods or services." Dallas Cowboys Cheer-
leaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F.Supp. 366, 374 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd 604
F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979) (citing RUDOLF C ALLMAA, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPr-
TION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 18.2(b), at 622-23 (3d ed. 1967)).
8
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A plaintiff suing for injunctive relief under section 43(a) does
not have to prove that consumers are actually deceived. 62 The
plaintiff must only demonstrate that the description is either liter-
ally false or has a tendency to mislead and confuse consumers.63 To
determine whether the public is likely to be confused, the Southern
District stated that "[t]he question is what is the likely ultimate im-
pression, upon customers and potential customers of the relevant
services and products which will be created by what is said and what
is reasonably implied."64 If the defendant's description creates the
impression that the plaintiff endorsed the product, then the de-
fendant has violated section 43(a).65
3. Case Law Developments in Section 43(a)
Although there are no cases directly controlling King, several
cases decided by the Southern District and the Second Circuit are
instructive in establishing that: 1) courts have applied section 43 (a)
to cover credits that are "incorrect designations" of authorship; 2)
courts have consistently used a likelihood of confusion test in sec-
tion 43(a) false credit attribution cases and 3) the Second Circuit
has held that the use of a possessory credit in conjunction with a
substantially altered work is a violation of section 43(a).66
In Harlequin Enterprises Ltd. v. Warner Books, Inc.,67 the Southern
District stated that the use of a false authorship credit violates sec-
tion 43(a).68 In Harlequin, author Don Pendleton licensed Harle-
quin Enterprises to use his name and the characters he created in a
series of books.69 Pendleton then relinquished participation in
62. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 467 F. Supp. at 374. Section 43(a) covers literal
falsity and indirect intimations. Id.
63. McNeil-P.C.C., Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., 938 F.2d 1544, 1549 (2d
Cir. 1991). A claim is literally false if a statement or description on its face causes
actual public confusion. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 467 F. Supp. at 374. A claim is
literally true under the statute, yet misleading, if the statement or description is
ambiguous. Id.
64. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, 467 F. Supp. at 374 (citing FTC v. Sterling
Drug, Inc., 317 F.2d 669, 674-75 (2d Cir. 1963)) (emphasis in original).
65. Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 626. Actual consumer confusion exists when a con-
sumer purchases a product from one company believing that another company
made or sold the product. Harriette K. Dorsen, Satiric Appropriation and the Law of
Libel, Trademark, and Copyright: Remedies Without Wrongs, 65 B.U. L. REv. 923, 946
(1985). A showing of a likelihood of consumer confusion is sufficient to implicate
§ 43(a). Allen, 610 F. Supp. at 626.
66. Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24-25 (2d Cir. 1976).
67. 639 F. Supp. 1081 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
68. Id. at 1091.
69. Id.
1994]
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writing the books.70 Harlequin published several books and attrib-
uted authorship to Pendleton in a possessory credit.71 Pendleton
sued Harlequin to enjoin its use of the possessory credit on books
that Pendleton did not write. 72 The Southern District held that the
author acquiesced to the credit in the licensing agreement, there-
fore, section 43(a) was not violated.73 In applying section 43(a) to
false credit attribution cases, the Southern District has consistently
hewed to the likelihood of confusion test for determining whether
injunctive relief is appropriate. 74 In Follett v. New American Library,
Inc.,75 the Southern District held that a co-author could not be at-
tributed as a primary author because the credit misrepresented the
co-author's contribution to the "finished work."76 In Follett, popular
novelist Ken Follett substantially edited a translated novel originally
written by several French authors.77 After a series of assignments of
the book's rights, Arbor House, a United States publishing com-
pany, released the book under Ken Follett's name, displaying his
name more prominently than the French authors. 78 Ken Follett
sued for injunctive relief and the court held that Arbor House
could not equally attribute Follett and the French authors. 79
The court found that Follett established a likelihood of confu-
sion and that the credits had a tendency to mislead the public as to
the authorship of the book.80 The court enjoined the use of credits
which attributed him as the book's principal author.81 The court
stated that section 43(a) "vindicate [s] 'the author's personal right to
70. Id. at 1082-84.
71. Id. at 1085. The credit was "Don Pendleton's 'Mack Bolan.'" Id.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. In a case involving false celebrity endorsement, the Southern District ap-
plied the likelihood of confusion test. In Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F.
Supp. 612 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), actor Woody Allen sued to enjoin the use of a Woody
Allen look-alike in a commercial for National Video. Id. at 617-18. The Southern
District held that National Video's use of a Woody Allen look-alike in a commercial
created a likelihood of "consumer confusion over plaintiff's endorsement or in-
volvement" with National Video and, therefore, violated § 43(a). Id. at 628. The
court stated that consumer confusion exists whether or not the public actually be-
lieves Allen appeared in the commercial. Id. Thus National Video violated § 43(a)
as long as the reference to Allen implied that he was involved in or approved of the
product. Id. at 628-29.
75. 497 F. Supp. 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
76. Id. at 313.
77. Id. at 307.
78. Id. at 308.
79. Id. at 313.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 312-13. The court determined that Follett was properly attributed as
a ca-author. Id.
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prevent the presentation of his work to the public in a distorted
form.' -82
The Second Circuit has extended section 43(a) to enjoin the
use of false possessory credits in connection with an author's al-
tered work. In Gilliam v. ABC,83 Monty Python, an English comedy
troupe, sought to enjoin ABC from televising versions of three pro-
grams that Monty Python wrote and performed on British television
that ABC edited for American television.8 4 After viewing the edited
programs, Gilliam, a member of Monty Python, sued ABC alleging
that ABC irreparably harmed Monty Python by airing an altered
work and crediting Monty Python as the creator of the altered pro-
gram.8 5 The Second Circuit held that the edited version of the tele-
vision programs falsely represented the plaintiff's work and it issued
an injunction preventing rebroadcast of the programs.86 Gilliam in-
dicates that a court may grant injunctive relief under section 43(a)
when a party misleadingly presents the altered work of an author as
the author's original work.8 7 These three cases provide the founda-
tion for the Second Circuit's possessory credit holding in King.
4. Based Upon Credit Case Law Under Section 43(a)
The Southern District has on two previous occasions held that
a based upon credit can be used as long as some portion of the
original work is in the derivative work. In Geisel v. Poynter Products,
Inc.,88 children's author and artist Theodore Geisel sought to en-
join the defendants from using his pen name, Dr. Seuss, in advertis-
ing a toy modeled after the plaintiff's characters, but which the
plaintiff did not develop. 89 The court stated that a manufacturer
cannot use any description that is intended to deceive consumers as
to the origin of the product or as to a celebrity's endorsement of
82. Id. at 313 (quoting Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976)).
83. 538 F.2d 14 (2d Cir. 1976).
84. Id. at 17. Monty Python entered into an agreement with the British
Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) to write and deliver scripts for use in a BBC tele-
vision series. Id. BBC subsequently licensed ABC to broadcast two Monty Python
television specials in the United States. Id. at 18.
85. Id. The alterations created a likelihood of public confusion with the origi-
nal program. Id. at 19.
86. Id. at 25. The Second Circuit found that "the truncated version [of the
program] at times omitted the climax of the skits... and at other times deleted
essential elements in the schematic development of a story line." Id.
87. Id. at 24-25.
88. 283 F. Supp. 261 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
89. Id. at 263. The court initially held the defendants liable because the de-
scriptions used by the defendants created a "false impression" that Geisel created
the toys. Id. at 267.
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the product.90 The Southern District enjoined the toymaker's use
of possessory credits. 91 However, in subsequent proceedings, the
court held that the toymaker did not violate section 43(a) because
the defendant changed the descriptions of the dolls to make it clear
that the toys were only based on the characters of Dr. Seuss, but were
not specifically produced or endorsed by him.92
In Geisel II, the Southern District found that the toymaker's use
of the based upon credit was literally true.93 The court determined
that the based upon credit was necessary to inform the public of the
dolls' origin.94
In Landon v. Twentieth Centuy-Fox Film Corp.,95 a case factually
similar to King, author Margaret Landon licensed Fox to adapt her
novel to film. 9 6 Landon protested when Fox released the television
films, which differed substantially from her novel, with a credit stat-
ing the films were based upon Landon's novel. 97 The Southern Dis-
trict upheld the filmmaker's use of the based upon credit, finding
the credit to be literally true despite the substantial alterations to
Landon's original work. 98 The court stated that "[e]ven without
permission from an author or the existence of a written agreement
with him, any person may truthfully state that a work is 'based on'
or 'suggested by' the work of that author."99 Thus the interest in
90. Id. at 268.
91. Id.
92. Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 354 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (Geisel
II) (emphasis added).
93. Id. at 353. The court found that the credit adequately described the ori-
gin of the dolls. Id.
94. Id.
95. 384 F. Supp. 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
96. Id. at 452. Part of the dispute centered on whether Landon licensed Fox
to produce only a motion picture or if the license included the right to produce
television films. Id. The court held that the license was broadly drafted and in-
cluded the implicit right to adapt the novel for television. Id. at 454.
97. Id. at 459.
98. Id. at 459-60. The licensing agreement contemplated credit attribution
no matter how substantial the alterations to the novel were. Id. at 459.
In Playboy Enterprises, Inc. v. Dumas, 831 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1993), the
estate of artist Patrick Nagel sued Playboy to enjoin its use of the credits "by Patrick
Nagel" and "from the Playboy Collection" on altered works by the late artist. Id.
The Southern District stated that the descriptions did not violate § 43(a) because
they were "literally true." Id. at 316. The court found no injury to the public be-
cause the descriptions created no confusion regarding the origin of the illustra-
tions nor did the descriptions impute endorsement of the altered illustrations by
the estate. Id.
99. Landon, 384 F. Supp. at 459. The Southern District does require that
some part of the original work appear in the derivative work. Curwood v. Affiliated
Distribs., 283 F. 219 (S.D.N.Y. 1922). In Cunvood, a based upon credit was used,
even though the film only borrowed a title from the original work. I&± Cunvood is
158
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preventing the public from being misled as to the origin of a work
outweighed the author's artistic objections.10
In Granz v. Harris,01 a case analogous to Landon, the Second
Circuit granted an injunction preventing the seller of musical
records from selling altered compositions under the credit
"[p] resented by Norman Granz."102 Granz had a contract requiring
the defendant to attribute him as musical composer of any records
it released.10 3 However, the defendant released a record that was
substantially altered from Granz's original composition, but which
acknowledged the work as Granz's.Y° 4 The Second Circuit found
that the defendant breached its contract with Granz and engaged
in unfair competition. 105 In Granz, the bulk of Granz's composition
was on the record, but the court found that the deletion of eight
minutes of the composition substantially altered Granz's work and
justified the court's conclusion that the use of the credit was incor-
rect.'0 6 However, Granz can be distinguished from King because
the court did not base the Granz decision on section 43(a) and be-
cause the credit discussed in Granz is a possessory credit, not a
based on credit.
These cases establish that section 43(a) is a flexible statute that
authors can use to enjoin false credit attributions. However, section
43(a) is not the sole form of relief for miscredited authors; authors
may also seek relief under state antidilution laws.
3. State Antidilution Laws
State antidilution laws prevent injury to a person's or a busi-
ness' reputation and prevent the erosion of the distinctive quality of
their names."17 Antidilution statutes focus on preventing unauthor-
ized use of a name, rather than focusing on consumer confusion.108
Thus miscredited authors may seek injunctive relief under state an-
clearly distinguishable from King because the film in King utilized portions of the
Short Story and Curwood predated § 43(a).
100. Landon, 384 F. Supp. at 459. The court found that the public could not
be deceived by a true credit which designated part of the origin of the films. Id.
101. 198 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1952).
102. Id. at 589.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 588.
106. Id. at 586-88.
107. Dorsen, supra note 65, at 946.
108. &e, e.g., N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d (McKinney 1984).
1994]
13
Wise: King v. Innovation Books: An Analysis of Credit Attribution with
Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1994
VIuANovA SPORTS & ENT. LAw FORUM [Vol. I: p. 147
tidilution statutes to prevent the unauthorized use of their
names.'
0 9
To obtain an injunction under New York's Antidilution Law, a
miscredited author must establish that the author's name is distinc-
tive and that a likelihood of dilution of the name exists if the unap-
proved use of the name continues.110 Similar to section 43(a), the
antidilution law's standard of proof does not require that dilution
actually exist."' Both statutes require only a mere likelihood that
the asserted harm, dilution or confusion, will occur.
In Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd.,' 1 2 the
Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders sought to enjoin Pussycat Cinema
from distributing the erotic film Debbie Does Dallas under section
43(a) and New York's Antidilution Law. 1" 3 The film contained
scenes that implied the Cheerleaders either participated in the
making of the film or endorsed it." 4 The Southern District held
that the defendant's unauthorized use of the Cheerleaders' trade-
mark established a cause of action under New York's Antidilution
Law." 5
The Southern District found for the Cheerleaders on both the
section 43(a) and New York Antidilution Law claims. 1 6 The court
concluded that Pussycat Cinema's continued use of the trademark
would inevitably dilute the Cheerleaders' business reputation."
7
The Second Circuit affirmed the Southern District, stating: "The
public's belief that the mark's owner sponsored or otherwise ap-
proved the use of the trademark satisfies the confusion require-
109. SELZ ET AL, supra note 47, § 17.06. Many courts, however, endeavor to
resolve the case on § 43(a) grounds. Therefore, the statutes are not fully inter-
preted by case law. Id.
110. N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAw § 368-d (McKinney 1984).
111. Dallas Cowboy Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 467 F. Supp.
366, 377 (S.D.N.Y.), affd 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979). In Mortellito v. Nina of
California, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 1288, 1296 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), the court discussed con-
ceptual differences between dilution and confusion:
Dilution is an injury that differs materially from that arising out of the
orthodox confusion. Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a
mark may be debilitated by another's use. This is the essence of dilution.
Confusion leads to immediate injury, while dilution is an infection which,
if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the advertising value of the
mark.
Id.
112. 467 F. Supp. 366 (S.D.N.Y.), affd 604 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1979).
113. Id. at 369.
114. Id. at 377.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
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ment.""18  Although Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders involved the
unauthorized use of a trademark, the holding illustrates that New
York's Antidilution Law can be used where there is a likelihood of
dilution from the unauthorized use of the plaintiffs name.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Narrative Analysis
In King, the Second Circuit reviewed the Southern District's
decision to grant injunctive relief prohibiting the use of the posses-
sory and based upon credits.1 9 The court stated that King had to
prove two elements: 1) either (a) he had a likelihood of success on
the merits or (b) he established serious questions about the merits
and showed hardship resulting from the use of the credit and 2) he
would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction were not granted. 20
1. Likelihood of Success
The Second Circuit first discussed King's likelihood of success
on the merits of his section 43(a) claim.' 2 ' After recognizing that a
false or misleading reference to the origin of a work can be ana-
lyzed under the Lanham Act,' 22 the court addressed the difference
between possessory and based upon credits.123
The Second Circuit held that the Southern District correctly
concluded that "King [was] likely to succeed on the merits of his
objection to the possessory credit," because King had no involve-
ment in creating the screenplay or film.' 2 4 The film distributors
contended that without evidence of public confusion King could
not succeed on the merits.' 25 The court rejected this argument for
two reasons. First, the court found that King's evidence of irrepara-
118. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604 F.2d
200, 205 (2d Cir. 1979).
119. King, 976 F.2d at 828. The Second Circuit used an abuse of discretion
standard. Id. A reviewing court finds abuse of discretion when it determines that
the trial court either applied an incorrect legal standard or reached a clearly erro-
neous finding of fact. Proctor & Gamble Co. v. Cheesebrough-Pond's Inc., 747
F.2d 114, 118 (2d Cir. 1984).
120. King, 976 F.2d at 828 (quoting Resolution Trust Corp. v. Elman, 949 F.2d
624, 626 (2d Cir. 1991)).
121. Id.
122. Id.; see Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 25 (2d. Cir. 1976).
123. King 976 F.2d at 829. For a further discussion of the difference between
possessory and based upon credits, see supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
124. King, 976 F.2d at 829. For a discussion of King's involvement, see supra
notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
125. King, 976 F.2d at 829.
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ble harm negated the requirement of public confusion. 126 Second,
the court determined that the attribution was false on its face be-
cause King did not participate in production of the film. 12 7 There-
fore, the Second Circuit rejected the possessory credit argument
and affirmed the Southern District's order prohibiting the use of
possessory credits.128
The Second Circuit next discussed the injunction with respect
to the based upon credit.129 The court held that the Southern Dis-
trict applied an incorrect standard to determine if the based upon
credit was misleading.15 0 According to the Second Circuit, the
Southern District erred in focusing on the portion of the film that
was attributable to the Short Story.' 5 ' The Second Circuit deter-
mined that the use of the likelihood of confusion test was inappro-
priate; instead it used the substantial similarity test. The court
apparently adopted the testimony of King's witness, John Breglio,
that substantial similarity was the industry standard used to deter-
mine when credit should be awarded.1 32 The court cited Harper &
Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises133 to support its determina-
126. For a discussion of irreparable harm, see infra notes 143-51 and accom-
panying text.
127. King, 976 F.2d at 829.
128. Id. at 833. The film could not be advertised as Stephen King's The Lawn-
mower Man.
129. Id. at 829.
130. Id. The Southern District significantly relied on "the proportion of the
film attributable to the Short Story." Id. at 830. However, the Second Circuit de-
termined that when analyzing copyrighted material, it is appropriate to examine
the degree of infringement, not just the amount of material that was allegedly
infringed. Id. at 829-30. The Second Circuit was able to review the standard the
Southern District used de novo because likelihood of confusion is a question of
law. Id.
131. Id. at 830. The Second Circuit rejected the Southern District's approach
because the Second Circuit was concerned that a based upon credit would become
misleading if substantial portions of a literary work and original scenes were inte-
grated in a film. Id.
132. Id. at 829. Breglio testified as an expert in the field of entertainment
law. Id.
133. 471 U.S. 539 (1985). In Harper &Row, the petitioners, copyright holders
of President Ford's memoirs, brought suit for damages against the publishers of
The Nation alleging violations of the Copyright Act (Act). Id. at 542. In 1977, peti-
tioners contracted with President Ford for the exclusive right to license prepubli-
cation excerpts from his then unwritten memoirs. Id. Two years later, petitioners
negotiated a licensing agreement with Time magazine giving them the exclusive
right to publish sections of President Ford's manuscript. Id. However, prior to
Time's release of the article, an editor of The Nation received the unpublished Ford
manuscript and "scooped" Time's anticipated publication. Id. at 543. Due to The
Nation's publication of its article, Time canceled its agreement with the petitioners.
Id. The Supreme Court held Nation Enterprises liable for damages because its
publication was not a fair use of the copyrighted material. Id. at 549; see Love v.
162
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tion that the appropriate standard of review is a quantitative and
qualitative analysis emphasizing the portions of the Short Story that
appeared in the film. 134
Applying the substantial similarity test, the Second Circuit
quoted another of King's expert witnesses, Professor George Stade,
who stated that "'substantial' portions of the Short Story appear in
the film," leading the court to conclude that the Short Story was,
therefore, substantially similar to the film. 135 The court then ap-
plied the contract language which it stated obligated Allied to
award King credit in any film based "wholly or substantially" on the
Short Story.136 The court found such language in two provisions of
the agreement: one provision contemplated alterations to the
Short Story while another allowed King to receive credit for any
film that was "substantially similar" to the Short Story.'3 7 Further-
more, the court stated that if Allied did not give King a based upon
credit, then King would have had a basis for relief against Allied. 138
Thus the court found that King had not demonstrated a likelihood
of success on the merits of his based upon credit claim.
The Second Circuit concluded its section 43(a) analysis by dis-
tinguishing King from Gilliam.13 9 The court agreed with its analysis
in Gilliam, which prevented granting a possessory credit when an
individual is falsely labelled as the creator of the work.'40 However,
the court refused to apply Gilliam to the issue of based upon credit
because Gilliam did not address that issue. 14'
Kwity, 706 F. Supp. 1123 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); New Era Publications Int'l v. Henry Holt
& Co., 695 F. Supp. 1493 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
134. King, 976 F.2d at 831.
135. Id. at 830. In both the movie and Short Story, there is a climactic scene
where the lawnmower man uses psychic powers to chase another character
through his house. In both, the murdered man is found in his birdbath and the
murder weapon is a red lawnmower. Id. at 826. Furthermore, King stated that
"the core of my story, such as it is, is in the movie." Id. at 828.
136. Id. at 831. The court was satisfied that the agreement addressed substan-
tial alterations to the Short Story and "obligate [d] Allied to give King credit in the
case of a film 'based wholly or substantially upon' the Short Story." Id.
137. Id. at 826.
138. Id. at 831. The court's reasoning on this point is confusing because King
was not seeking credit, he was declining it. It is doubtful that King would ever sue
Allied to receive credit.
139. Id. The King court stated that in GiUiam Monty Python's programs were
edited and then rebroadcast as Monty Python's work, therefore, the case only in-
volved a dispute over use of possessory credits. Id.
140. King, 976 F.2d at 831.
141. Id.
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2. Irreparable Harm
After determining that King established a likelihood of success
on the merits with respect to the possessory credit claim, the court
discussed whether King would suffer irreparable harm if the injunc-
tion were not granted. 142 After reviewing the evidence, the Second
Circuit found that an injunction was necessary to prevent irrepara-
ble harm to King. 143 The court disagreed with the argument that
King suffered no irreparable harm solely because he waited eight
months before seeking relief.144
The film distributors also argued that King suffered no irrepa-
rable harm because King stated that he would not bring legal ac-
tion. 45 The court did not accept this argument, as King's letter was
silent on his feelings about the credits.' 46 The Second Circuit
found that the delay between discovering the distributors' use of
the possessory credit and filing suit did not negate the evidence of
irreparable harm. 1 4 7
Allied's final argument suggested that King failed to prove ir-
reparable harm because he could provide no evidence of damage
to his public popularity. 48 To rebut this argument, King provided
evidence of public harm by citing reviews of the film which found it
to be his personal failure. 149 The court held that King's ability to
prove that the wrongful attribution potentially injured his reputa-
tion established irreparable harm. 150
142. Id.
143. Id. at 831-32.
144. Id. at 831. King learned of the movie in October 1991, yet did not bring
suit until June 1992. Id. However, during that period King made continuous ob-
jections to use of the possessory credit. Id. For a further discussion of King's ob-
jections, see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text.
145. King, 976 F.2d at 831-32. King wrote to the agent handling King's film
rights, stating that "he was impressed by the movie and that he was 'shelving' legal
action." Id. at 831.
146. Id. at 832.
147. Id.
148. Id. The appellant's argument was that "King himself enjoyed the movie,
continues to be a popular literary figure, and was unable to specify particular fi-
nancial injury." Id.
149. Id. One reviewer stated: "Steven [sic] King's latest film, The Lawnmower
Man, continues to reinforce the impression that he and Hollywood just don't work
well together." Id.
150. Id. Instead of reviewing King's evidence of harm, the Southern District
held that misattribution alone causes irreparable harm. King v. Allied Vision, Ltd.,
807 F. Supp. 297, 304 (S.D.N.Y. 1992). Thus the Southern District relied on settled
law which stated that any misrepresentation created a presumption of irreparable
harm. Id. The Second Circuit agreed with the Southern District.
The Second Circuit also discussed the film distributors' assertion of the equi-
table doctrine of laches. King, 976 F.2d at 833. The doctrine of laches is defined
164
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3. State Claims and Jurisdictional Issues in King
The Second Circuit stated that the outcome would be the same
under both section 43(a) and New York's Antidilution Law; there-
fore; King would win under both laws regarding the use of posses-
sory credits but would not win with regard to the based upon
credit.' 5 ' The court then rejected the film distributors' jurisdic-
tional arguments. 152 The court also found Allied's motion to reas-
sign the case meritless. 153
B. Critical Analysis
First, this Section will discuss the Second Circuit's analysis of
possessory credits. Second, it will examine the court's use of the
substantial similarity standard and its finding that the Short Story
and the film were substantially similar. Third, it will present an al-
ternative basis for upholding the use of the based upon credits. Fi-
nally, it will address the equities weighing against requiring King to
be associated with the film.
1. Possessoy Credit Analysis
The Second Circuit correctly concluded that Allied could not
use a possessory credit because Allied presented no evidence of
King's involvement with the film. King had no involvement in cre-
ating the screenplay; in fact, the screenplay was completed over a
year before King learned of its existence. 154 As the Second Circuit
stated in Gilliam "'To deform [a writer's] work is to present him to
the public as the creator of a work not his own, and thus makes him
subject to criticism for work he has not done.'"1 55
as a party's neglect to assert a right or claim, which considered with lapse of time
and other circumstances, causes prejudice to the adverse party. BLAcK's LAw Dic-
TIONARY 875 (6th ed. 1990). The film distributors contended that October 1991,
not March 1992, was the proper date from which to consider the laches question.
King, 976 F.2d at 833.
Recognizing that laches questions are discretionary for the district court, the
Second Circuit held that the Southern District had not abused its discretion in
rejecting the equitable defense of laches. Id. Furthermore, the court stated that
even if October 1991 were the applicable tolling date, King did not unreasonably
delay initiation of the suit. Id. The court concluded that King's continuous objec-
tions to the film distributors' credits sufficiently evidenced that the suit had been
brought in a timely fashion. Id.
151. King, 976 F.2d at 833.
152. Id.
153. Id. The court did not explain why appellant's argument was meritless.
154. Id. at 826-27.
155. Gilliam v. ABC, 538 F.2d 14, 24 (2d Cir. 1976) (quoting Martin A. Roe-
der, The Doctrine of Moral Right, 53 HARv. L. REv. 554, 569 (1940)).
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In addition, the Second Circuit properly analyzed the issue of
irreparable harm to King. An author's livelihood is based on the
public's perception of the author's last work. If the public does not
find an author's work worthy of its patronage, the author may find
great difficulty in maintaining an audience and receiving offers for
new projects.156 Therefore, misleading credit attribution can dam-
age a celebrity's reputation by linking the celebrity, in this case
King, with an unsuccessful work.
Neither the Second Circuit nor the Southern District required
King to prove actual injury to his reputation. Both presumed King
suffered irreparable harm because they found that the possessory
credits misrepresented King's participation in the making of the
film. King produced evidence that the film received poor reviews
from critics;157 therefore, he was able to demonstrate actual harm
to his professional reputation. 58 While the Second Circuit's analy-
sis of the possessory credit issue was routine, its analysis of the based
upon credit was novel.
2. Based Upon Credit Analysis and the Substantial Similarity Test
After comparing aspects of the Short Story to the film, the Sec-
ond Circuit determined that "substantial similarity" existed between
the two works. 15 9 Thus, due to the language in the assignment
agreement, Allied could acknowledge King in a based upon
credit.' 6° The court replaced the section 43(a) likelihood of confu-
sion test with the standard of substantial similarity found in the li-
censing agreement.' 6' The court erred in using the substantial
156. The Southern District stated:
Plaintiff need not demonstrate lost profits or tangible damage to his rep-
utation to show irreparable harm. Plaintiff's fans who have read his story
and go to see the film because of its association with plaintiff are likely to
be annoyed and confused when they discover that the film is not actually
based upon plaintiff's work. The public may well blame plaintiff for their
disappointment and refrain from viewing future films claiming to be asso-
ciated with him. Moreover, even if plaintiff sustains no measurable loss in
profits, plaintiff's name and reputation are inevitably diluted by the misat-
tribution to him of works which he did not create.
King v. Allied Vision, 807 F. Supp. at 304.
157. King 976 F.2d at 832.
158. Id. at 826-27.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 826.
161. Robert J. Shaughnessy, Note, Trademark Parody: A Fair Use and First
Amendment Analysis, 72 VA. L. REv. 1079, 1084-85 (1986). In trademark cases, the
proper test requires determining whether there is the possibility of consumer con-
fusion as to the product's true origin. Id. The likelihood of confusion test is a
flexible test. Id.
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similarity test' 62 for two reasons: 1) the substantial similarity test is
used to determine infringement between the same types of work,
which was not the case in King1 63 and 2) there are logical flaws in
the Second Circuit's argument that by incorporating the core of
King's Short Story into the film, no amount of extraneous material
in the film would render the two works dissimilar. 164 Additionally,
the Second Circuit's finding that the two works are substantially
similar is questionable.
The Second Circuit erred when it used the substantial similar-
ity test, a test designed to measure copying between projects and to
prevent infringement of one work by a competing work of the same
type. 165 Substantial similarity is primarily used to determine
whether one publication has infringed on a copyrighted publica-
tion of the same type by substantially imitating or copying the copy-
righted publication. 16 6 The test does not address whether a film
adaptation is substantially similar to a story because copyright in-
fringement is not the alleged injury. In King, unauthorized copying
of the Short Story was not the basis of the suit; it was King's desire
162. The substantial similarity test is primarily used in copyright infringement
cases. One author notes that the convergence of different intellectual property
tests is harmful because the different branches of intellectual property law serve
different purposes. Michael Todd Helfand, Wen Mickey Mouse Is as Strong as Super-
man: The Convergence of Intellectual Property Laws to Protect Fictional Literary and Picto-
rial Characters, 44 STAN. L. REv. 623, 652-53 (1992) (stating copyright similarity test
is replacing trademark consumer confusion test). As the Second Circuit stated in
dicta in Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, "it is unlikely that [copyright law] is applicable to
trademark infringements" because the purposes behind copyright and trademark
law are different. Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, Ltd., 604
F.2d 200, 207 (2d Cir. 1979).
163. See, e.g., Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539,
565-66 (1985) (comparing infringement between two magazine articles).
164. King, 976 F.2d at 830. The court stated: "Our concern is... that under
the district court's apparent approach, substantially all of a literary work could be
taken for use in a film and, if unrelated ideas, themes and scenes are tacked on or
around the extracted work, a 'based upon' credit would be deemed misleading."
Id. The Second Circuit glossed over the Southern District's finding of "fundamen-
tal differences" between the two works. Id. (citing King v. Allied Vision, Ltd., 807
F. Supp. 300, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1992)). The Southern District did not state that the
film "tacked on" unrelated ideas.
165. Thomas M. Cunningham, Note, Extending Shaw v. Lindheim: Substantial
Similarity and the Idea-Expression Distinction in Copyright of Non-Literay Subject Matter,
55 U. Prrr. L. REv. 239, 240-41 (1993).
166. See id. Cunningham stated substantial similarity is used when
artist A paints and exhibits a landscape, there appears on the market a
suspiciously similar landscape painted by artist B and not authorized by A,
the... question is, given B's access to A's painting, whether B's work is so
similar that it can be regarded as an infringing copy of A's work.
Id. Thus the works must be of the same type.
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to disassociate himself from the film regardless of any similarities
between the two works.
Second, the Second Circuit erred in stating that substantial
similarities exist between works when the core of one work is found
in the other.167 The court stated that irrelevant material can be
added to the core of the other work without rendering the works
dissimilar.'r According to the Second Circuit, the works would be
"substantially similar," even if the core of King's Short Story were
incorporated into a film where the Short Story is not integral to the
film. 1 6 9
The Second Circuit also erred in relying on the testimony of
King's expert witness, Professor Stade, who testified not that the
works were similar, but that "substantial" portions of King's Short
Story are in the film.' 70 From this, the court concluded that the
works are substantially similar. It is illogical to conclude that the
mere inclusion of the whole of one work into another renders the
two works substantially similar. The derivative work may include so
much dissimilar material that the original work becomes irrelevant
and undiscoverable.
The Second Circuit's finding that the works are substantially
similar sharply contrasts with the Southern District's finding that
the works were dissimilar.17' Overall, the Short Story and the film
are not similar as they have very different premises. 172 The Short
Story focuses on the relationship between a suburban homeowner
and the lawnmower man. 173 The Short Story's horrific aspects exist
because the lawnmower man serves as an agent of the pagan god
Pan. 174 Unlike the Short Story, the climax of the film revolves
around the scientific developments of virtual reality technology. 175
The climactic scene of the Short Story is inserted into the film; its
167. The Landon court suggests that the inclusion of some material, no mat-
ter how minute, in a derivative work justifies the use of a based upon credit. Lan-
don v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450, 459 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
168. King, 976 F.2d at 831.
169. See id.
170. Id. at 830.
171. Compare King, 976 F.2d at 830 with King v. Allied Vision, 807 F. Supp. at
305.
172. Compare supra note 10 and accompanying text with supra note 15 and
accompanying text. King stated that his "short story is all about a guy who's too
lazy to mow his own lawn, so he hires somebody who cuts the grass by chomping
away at it and any living creatures in his path." Corliss, supra note 9, at 62. Mean-
while, the movie is about "mad scientists and virtual-reality video games." Id.
173. King, 976 F.2d at 826.
174. Id.
175. THE LAWNMOWER MAN (New Line Cinema Corp. 1992).
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presence, however, is unrelated to the film's plot. 7 6 Therefore, ir-
respective of the substantial portions of the Short Story that appear
in the film, the derivative work is not substantially similar to the
original work.
Although the contract provision appears at first glance to have
been inserted in the contract as a means of ensuring acknowledg-
ment for King's efforts in creating the original work, the credit pro-
vision actually requires King to surrender the right to use a credit to
the filmmaker's discretion. 177 The provision in the agreement re-
quired Allied to give him credit for any film based "wholly or sub-
stantially" on his work, but it was Allied's discretion, not King's, to
decide both whether to give King credit and whether the works
were substantially similar.' 78
2. What the Court Should Have Done
Without focusing on the language of the assignment agree-
ment, the court could have permitted the based upon credit by fo-
cusing on the possibility of public confusion. The court could have
stated that Allied needed to use the based upon credit to alert the
public that the premise of the film derived from King's Short Story.
Use of King's name in the based upon credit did not imply that
King endorsed the film, it merely signified to the public that
although the film and King's work had differences, many of the
ideas in the resultant film came from the Short Story. According to
the Second Circuit's definition of based upon credit, if Allied had
not acknowledged King's Short Story, it likely would have violated
the Lanham Act by misleading the public into believing that Allied
and New Line created an original screenplay which had no other
sources.179
The Second Circuit also ignored the Southern District's per-
suasive decisions in Landon and Geisel I. Both decisions established
that a based upon credit can be used as long as it is literally true.180
The Southern District implied that a based upon credit is always
literally true as long as some part of the original work is included in
176. Compare supra note 10 and accompanying text with supra note 15 and
accompanying text.
177. SELZ ET AL, supra note 47, § 17.08.
178. Id.
179. See King 976 F.2d at 831 (stating that King would have "cause to com-
plain" if not given based upon credit). King would not have contested this
violation.
180. Landon v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 384 F. Supp. 450, 459
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Geisel v. Poynter Prods., Inc., 295 F. Supp. 331, 353 (S.D.N.Y.
1968).
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the derivative work.181 According to this line of reasoning, the orig-
inal work does not have to be an integral or significant part of the
derivative work. Both cases relied heavily on preventing consumer
confusion, not on assessing the degree of similarities between the
two works-a test more appropriate in infringement cases.
Thus the Second Circuit appears to state that based upon cred-
its can be justified only by showing substantial similarity between
the original and the derivative work. This outcome is erroneous
because Landon and GeiselIdemonstrate that even minimal similar-
ities justify the use of based upon credits.
Additionally, the Second Circuit ignored the principles of eq-
uity in requiring the based upon credit. King should have the right
to disassociate himself from a product that is different from his
original work. By permitting Allied to use the based upon credit,
the court allows Allied to trade on King's name and to profit from
its association with King. Allied can now use King's name to pro-
mote the film even though King does not want to be associated with
the film. The Second Circuit stated that it "thinks that King would
have cause to complain if he were not afforded the 'based upon'
credit."182 However, King clearly stated that he did not want credit.
V. IMPACT
The Second Circuit's decision in King provides authors and at-
torneys with a pointed reminder that great care must accompany
the drafting of assignment agreements. When discussing credit at-
tribution in assignment agreements, both parties must recognize
that they are addressing the freedom of expression interests of both
parties as well as control over licensing. By requiring a based upon
credit to appear in the film, the court required King to implicitly
endorse the film and aid in its marketing. The court required a
based upon credit by analogizing King's right to demand credit if
Allied had failed to give him credit and King had sought credit, to
Allied's right to use King's name even if he did not want his name
used, an event the contract did not contemplate.
King attempted to assert his freedom of expression by attempt-
ing to disassociate himself from the film. The court refused to al-
low King to do this because it decided that the assignment
agreement provision allowing him to demand credit allowed Allied
to use the based upon credit over his objections. By forcing King to
181. Landon, 384 F. Supp. at 459.
182. King, 976 F.2d at 831 (emphasis in original).
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honor the contract with Allied and New Line, the court also forced
him to be associated with a film that he did not find satisfactory.
The King decision has serious ramifications because it forces an au-
thor to associate with a derivative work that has only some similarity
to the author's original work.
The most important aspect of the King decision involved its use
of an erroneous test for determining when the use of a based upon
credit is appropriate. By using a standard that favors the film-
maker, the Second Circuit has opened the doors to forced associa-
tions and endorsements by authors to works they did not create.
Under the Second Circuit's analysis, a licensee can use a based
upon credit as long as the core of the licensor's work is present,
even though the core of the licensed work is surrounded by irrele-
vant material.
Therefore, King is problematic for authors whose works are
substantially similar to films but translate poorly to the screen. The
Second Circuit's decision in King exemplifies that an author's dis-
satisfaction with cinematic interpretation is not a basis for relief if a
substantial amount of the original work is contained in the film and
if non-use of an author's name in a credit will create public
confusion.
To allay an author's concerns regarding the cinematic inter-
pretation of the author's work, an author should be very careful in
limiting the use of the author's name. An author may wish to have
final approval of the film before credit is attributed. However, all
authors will not be in a position to make such a demand. When
authors not in position to make this demand agree to contracts in-
volving the assignation of their rights, they should find some way to
retain more control over the use of their names. The Second Cir-
cuit should reconsider its analysis in King in order to protect author
dissatisfaction with respect to cinematic presentation.
Lauren M. Wise
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